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I.     Introduction  
 
On a global scale wage differences are enormous across countries ranging from, 
for example, 1,10 € per hour in China to almost 28 € per hour in Germany (see, e.g. 
Sinn (2006)). Wage differences like this constitute a central explanation for the 
increasingly dominant business practice of international outsourcing across a wide 
range of industries. For example, Business Week (2003), Amiti and Wei (2004) as 
well as Rishi and Saxena (2003) refer to the huge difference in labour costs as the key 
explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both manufacturing and services 
to countries with low labour costs. However, the exploitation of the marginal cost 
advantages offered by production in low-wage countries typically requires that the 
firms make sunk investments into the establishment of networks of suppliers in the 
relevant low-wage countries. 
In countries with strong labour market imperfections the labour unions, and 
sometimes citizens more generally, typically express deep concerns when facing the 
challenge of large-scale outsourcing. These concerns often seem to focus on the 
consequences of large-scale outsourcing for employment in high-wage countries. This 
is the topic of this article. More precisely, we design a model to answer the following 
questions: What is the effect of a commitment to outsourcing on wage formation in an 
imperfectly competitive labour market where labour unions and firms negotiate over 
wages? What are the associated effects on equilibrium unemployment in a country 
with such labour market imperfections? We also explore the relationship between 
outsourcing and wage formation in the other direction, by asking: How will the 
presence of labour market imperfections in the high-wage country impact on the 
outsourcing incentives of firms? Will stronger labour market imperfections increase 
the optimal scale of outsourcing?            
We find that the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of 
the share of outsourcing, a result consistent with existing empirical research, as we 
will see below. Furthermore, within the framework of our model we show that a 
production mode with a higher proportion of outsourcing reduces the negotiated wage 
in the high-wage country with an imperfectly competitive labour market. For this 
reason outsourcing reduces equilibrium unemployment. Finally, we characterize the  
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optimal production mode and show that stronger labour market imperfections lead to 
a production mode with a higher share of outsourcing.   
Despite the apparent significance of the issue it is somewhat surprising to 
observe that the existing research has explored the implications international 
outsourcing for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of labour market 
imperfections only to a fairly limited extent. Below we briefly describe the relevant 
literature focusing on this issue so as to highlight how this study adds to our 
knowledge. 
Danthine and Hunt (1994) have both theoretically and empirically studied the 
effects of international outsourcing and foreign direct investment on wage formation 
in the home country. They showed that higher product market integration implies 
intensified product market competition, which moderates wage increases in unionised 
labour markets. Zhao (1998) has studied the impact of foreign direct investment on 
wages and employment, when labour-management bargaining is industry-wide. He 
argued that foreign direct investment reduces the negotiated wage if the union focuses 
on wages. Glass and Saggi (2001) have studied the causes of outsourcing and its 
effects, finding that higher international outsourcing lowers both the relative wage of 
workers and increases the returns from innovation. 
Skaksen and Sorensen (2001) have studied the effects on trade unions of firms’ 
foreign direct investments, which are made prior to the stage of the wage bargaining. 
They argued that if there is a high degree of substitutability (complementarity) 
between the activities in the home country and in the host country, then it is likely 
that foreign direct investments reduce (increase) negotiated wages. Skaksen (2004) 
has analyzed the implications of outsourcing, in terms of both potential (non-realized) 
and realized international outsourcing, for wage setting and employment with   
imperfectly competitive labour markets. He assumed that the firms do not commit 
themselves to outsourcing prior wage negotiation, but that the outsourcing decisions 
are made after the wage negotiations.   
Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2005) have analyzed the incentives of firms 
operating in unionized industries to outsource the production of intermediate goods to 
foreign low-cost subcontractors. They argue that firms will have returns from 
outsourcing if they face stronger unions, contributing to higher domestic wages. 
Furthermore, they show that intensified product market competition will increase the 
incentives for international outsourcing. However, since their analysis is restricted to  
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a partial equilibrium model they do not analyze the relationship between equilibrium 
unemployment and international outsourcing, 
In terms of empirics Feenstra and Hanson (1999) have studied the impact of 
foreign outsourcing and technology on wages using U.S. data over the period 1979-
1990. According to their findings, wages of low-skilled workers have fallen relative 
to those of high-skilled workers. Recently, Senses (2006) has argued that an increased 
probability of outsourcing associated with a decline in foreign intermediate input 
prices and an increase in the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic 
inputs might increase the wage elasticity of labour demand. He has provided relevant 
empirical evidence, according to which a production mode with more outsourcing 
increases the wage elasticity of labour demand.  
Our study proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the 
model as well as the time sequence of the decisions in terms of outsourcing, wage 
bargaining and labour demand. Labour demand by firms is studied in section III, 
wheras we focus on wage determination through Nash bargaining in Section IV. 
Section V explores how the production mode affects equilibrium unemployment. In 
section VI we investigate the optimal outsourcing decision in the presence of labour 
market imperfections. Finally, we present concluding comments in Section VII. 
 
II.    Basic Framework  
 
We focus on a model with imperfections in the domestic labour market. In the 
long run, at stage 1, firms establish a network for foreign outsourcing. Outsourced 
production in a foreign low-wage country has the advantage of avoiding the wage 
mark-ups imposed by the unions in the firm’s domestic high-wage country. More 
precisely, with outsourced production the firm can acquire labour input at the factor 
price c, which is lower than the negotiated wage w in the high-wage country. 
However, there is a fixed (sunk) cost of establishing capacity for foreign outsourced 
production. In   order to exploit M units of outsourced labour input the firm has to 
make the irreversible investment  ) (M g  with the properties that  0 ) ( > ′ M g  and 
0 ) ( > ′ ′ M g .    
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The outsourcing decisions serve as commitments relative to wage negotiation 
  and employment decisions in the home country. Thus, the outsourcing decisions are 
  
made in anticipation of their effects on wage setting and labour demand. A stage 2 
there is wage negotiation between firms and labour unions and this bargaining is 
conducted conditional on the outsourcing commitments. The wage negotiations in 
their turn take place in anticipation of the consequences for  labour  demand.  At  stage 
3 firms make employment decisions by taking the negotiated wage rate and the 
production mode as given.  
We summarize the time sequence of decisions in Figure 1. In the subsequent sections 
we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using backward induction. 
               Stage 1     Stage 2      Stage 3 
                            t i m e  
         
outsourcing   wage    labour  demand  L 
    decision  M   bargaining 
N w   
  
 Figure  1:  Time sequence of decisions 
This timing structure captures the idea of long-term production mode decisions, 
which are inflexible at the stage when the wage negotiations are undertaken. Such a 
timing structure seems plausible when the implementation of a production mode with 
outsourcing requires irreversible long-term investments for the establishment of a 
network of component suppliers. Of course, in principle, the relative timing between 
the negotiated wage setting and the production mode decisions could also be reversed 
so as to capture that the negotiated wage serves as a long-term commitment relative to 
the production mode decision. This has been done by Skaksen (2004) using a Cobb-
Douglas production function with domestic and foreign labour. 


























− − − 1 1 1
) 1 ( ) , ( aL M a L M R ,                                   (1)           
where  M  denotes the firm’s labour input acquired from external suppliers through 
outsourcing,  L is the amount of labour employed in-house, and a, σ and ρ  are 
parameters satisfying 0 < a < 1, and  1 0 < < ρ , respectively. In (1) a is the 
distribution parameter (see e.g. Arrow et al (1961)) between the production factors, 
while  σ captures the elasticity of substitution between the two different types of 
labour inputs. In what follows we assume that  1 0 < <σ . This can be justified as 
follows: Under this assumption a production mode with more outsourcing increases 
the wage elasticity of labour demand, as we will show in the next section. Senses 
(2006) has provided relevant empirical evidence, which lies in conformity with this 
implication. Through the parameter ρ  the production function (1) exhibits 
diminishing returns to scale. Overall, this production function introduces, as we will 
see, interesting relationships between the production mode and equilibrium 
unemployment both in the short and in the long run, i.e. no matter whether the 
production mode is exogenous or endogenous.  
 
III.   Labour Demand 
 
The firm decides on domestic in-house employment so as to maximize the profit 
function 
{ L w L M R
L
− = ) , ( max
) (
π                          (2) 
by taking both the negotiated wage rate w and the established capacity for 
outsourced labour inputs M  as given. The necessary first-order condition associated 
with (2) is  
0 = − = w RL L π                 (3) 
and the associated second-order condition  0 < = LL LL R π  holds true. The formulation 
(3) is an implicit characterization of labour demand capturing the familiar idea that  
  6
the firm expands in-house employment until marginal return of labour coincides with 
the wage. For the CES production function (1) the first-order condition (3) can be 
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labour demand in terms of outsourced labour inputs, wage rate, elasticity of 
substitution and parameters a and ρ  as follows 
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The wage elasticity of labour demand, which turns out to be important later on, can 





























































M w    ,          (4) 
where  L M m / ≡  denotes the ratio between the labour inputs acquired through 
outsourcing and domestic in-house employment. For short and admittedly somewhat 
incompletely, we will subsequently refer to m as the share of outsourced production.  




depends on two structural features in addition to the parameters a and ρ  of the 
production function: (i) the elasticity of substitution between the labour inputs 
acquired through outsourcing and domestic in-house employment (σ ) and (ii) the 
production mode, or, more precisely, the share of outsourced production ( L M m / ≡ ). 
We now ask: What is the effect of the production mode on the wage elasticity of 
labour demand? This is an important question to answer as the wage elasticity in the 
case of CES production function affects the negotiated wage. Differentiating (4) with 

















































M    .          (5) 
Under decreasing returns to scale ( 1 < ρ ) we can formulate the following property 
from (5).     
Proposition 1 The wage elasticity of labour demand depends on the elasticity of 
substitution between labour inputs acquired through outsourcing and in-house 
employment. The wage elasticity of labour is an increasing function of the share 
of outsourced production when  1 < σ .   
 According  to  (5)  the technological elasticity of substitution between the 
production factors L and M is of primary importance for the relationship between 
the share of outsourced production ( L M m / ≡ ) and the wage elasticity of labour 
demand. When M and  L are ‘gross complements’ ( 1 < σ ), a higher  L M m / ≡  will 
increase the wage elasticity of labour demand due to the fact that it will raise the 
home country labour share. 
 
IV.  Wage Determination via Nash Bargaining  
 
   We now proceed to investigate wage determination and continue to consider 
the acquired outsourced production M  as given. We apply the Nash bargaining 
solution following the ‘right-to-manage’ approach so that the wage negotiations take 
place in anticipation of optimal price and employment decisions by the firms (see e.g. 
Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Chapter 7). The union’s objective function is assumed 
to be   ) ( ˆ * * L N b wL U − + = , where b is the (exogenous) outside option available to 
union members and N is the number of union members ( )
* L N > . The threat points 
for the union and for the representative firm are  ) (M g M c
o − − = π  and  b N U
o = ,  
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respectively. Hence we have that  ) ( ˆ * b w L Nb U U − = − =  and 
. ) , ( ) ( ˆ
* * wL L M R M g M c − = + + = π π  
Following the Nash bargaining approach the firm and the labour union negotiate 
with respect to the wage so as to solve the optimization problem  
  
        { [] [ ]
β β −
− − = Ω
1 * * *
) (
) , ( ) ( max wL L M R b w L
w
     s.t.   0 = L π ,                           (6) 
where the relative bargaining power of the union is β  and that of the firm is  ) 1 ( β − . 
The necessary first-order condition for the negotiated wage can be written as 
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Substituting the expressions (8a) and (8b) into the first-order condition (7) yields, 
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1 .             (9) 
According to (9) the negotiated wage rate depends positively on the outside 
option (b) and on the relative bargaining power of the labour union (β ), while  
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negatively on the  wage elasticity of labour demand (η). The negotiated wage is 
affected by the share of outsourced production ( ) /L M  both directly and indirectly 
though its impact on the wage elasticity of labour demand in a way, which depends 
on the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour 
input.  
By differentiating the negotiated wage (9) with respect to M we find under the 
assumption  1 0 < <σ that  
0
1












































































.          (10) 
The relationship (10) characterizes how the share of outsourced production can 
serve as a strategic commitment device, with the effect of inducing wage moderation. 
The technological features summarized by the elasticity of substitution between the 
two types of labour inputs play an important role for this wage-moderating effect of 
outsourcing. The intuition for this wage-moderating effect can be understood as 
follows: A higher outsourcing-in-house production ratio decreases the negotiated 
wage rate via two channels: (1) it becomes harder for the union to extract rent in 
negotiations because of the induced higher wage elasticity of labour demand, and (2) 
a higher outsourcing-in-house production ratio increases the negative effect of the 











 when  1 < σ  and thus moderates wage 
formation.  
     We now summarize our analysis of the wage determination in 
 
Proposition 2 The negotiated wage rate depends negatively on the wage elasticity 
of labour demand and a higher share of outsourced production will decrease the 
negotiated wage rate when  1 < σ .   
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From the negotiated wage (9) we can infer a number of properties for special 
cases. If all the bargaining power lies with the union ( 1 = β ), the Nash bargaining 














  ,     
according to which the wage mark-up depends negatively on the wage elasticity of  
labour demand, which is a function of the share of outsourced production. In the 
opposite case with all the bargaining power concentrated to the firm ( 0 = β ), the 
relationship between the negotiated wage and the production mode ratio disappears. 
In this case the negotiated wage converges to the competitive wage with  b w
C = , i.e. 
the wage mark-up is eroded. Intuitively this seems to make sense for the following 
reason. The share of outsourced production serves as a strategic commitment device, 
which will affect the distribution of the rents, achieved through bargaining, in 
imperfectly competitive labour markets. Once the labour market imperfections are 
eroded the production mode can no longer play such a strategic role. 
 
V.  The Effects of Outsourcing on Equilibrium Unemployment 
 
We now move on to explore the determinants of equilibrium unemployment in a 
general equilibrium framework. We are in this section interested in the relationships 
between the exogenous production mode (outsourcing) and equilibrium 
unemployment.  
According to (9) the negotiated wage rate in industry i is of the form  b A w
N = , 





























A   .                        (11)    ( 
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In the presence of the positive relative bargaining power of the labour union the 




 because the wage elasticity of labour demand  . 1 > η This mark-
up factor is, in principle, industry-specific. In a general equilibrium the term b should 
be re-interpreted as the endogenous outside option, which we specify in a 
conventional way as 
uB w u b
N + − = ) 1 ( ,                                                                                   (12)   
where  u is the unemployment rate, B  captures the unemployment benefit and 
N w  
denotes the negotiated wage rate in all identical industries in the economy (see 
Nickell and Layard (1999) p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion). Assuming a 
constant benefit replacement ratio 
N w B q =  and substituting (12) for  b into the 













,                                                                                     (13)   
where the wage mark-up A is given by (11).   
According to (13) a higher benefit-replacement ratio, q, and a higher mark-up 
in the wage determination,  A, will increase equilibrium unemployment. Further, 
from the mark-ups in the wage determination we can conclude that higher wage 
elasticity of labour demand will decrease equilibrium unemployment.  
As for the impact of the production mode (the outsourcing) on equilibrium 
unemployment we initially observe under  1 0 < <σ that   
0
1








































































M .          (14) 
This offers a characterization of the production mode as a strategic commitment 








, we can  
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explore the effect of the share of outsourced production on equilibrium 
unemployment by combining (13) and (14).  According to Proposition 2 the 
relationship between the outsourcing commitment and wage formation and thereby 
the relationship between the production mode and equilibrium unemployment 
depends on the size of the elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour 
inputs.  
Our new findings concerning the determinants of equilibrium unemployment with 
exogenous production modes can now be summarized in  
Proposition 3 A production mode with a higher share of outsourced production 
will reduce equilibrium unemployment when  1 < σ .  
Proposition 3 predicts that there is a systematic relationship between the 
production mode and equilibrium unemployment such that a higher share of 
outsourced production promotes employment in the high-wage country, because the 
outsourcing induces downward pressure on the negotiated wage.  
 
VI.  Optimal Outsourcing: The Long-Run Perspective  
 
So far we have restricted ourselves to a short run or medium run perspective, 
where the firm has committed itself to the magnitude of its outsourcing activities. We 
now turn to explore the initial stage of the decision making structure. At this stage the 
firm determines the investments into the establishment of outsourced production 
capacity. We are particularly interested in characterizing how the labour market 
imperfections impact on the equilibrium production mode, which, as we have 
analysed in the previous section, will have effects on the equilibrium unemployment.  
In the long run the firm determines the magnitude of the outsourcing activities 
so as to maximize profits. The firm has rational expectations regarding the subsequent 
outcomes with respect to wage negotiation and employment and thus, the long-run  
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production mode decision internalizes the effects of the share of outsourced 
production on wages and employment. 
The long-run production mode is determined by the optimization problem 
  ) ( ) , ( max
* * M g M c L w L M R
N
M − − − = π             (15)    (
                                         s.t.      0 = Ωw and  0 = L π .  
The constraints capture that the production mode is set in anticipation of the 
subsequent determination of wages and employment. By applying the envelope 
theorem we find that the necessary first-order condition associated with the 
optimization problem (15) is given by 
     0 ) (
















.           (16) 
Next we briefly analyze the effects of labour market imperfections on optimal 
outsourcing. From (16) we can directly see that the presence of the imperfect labour 







, as was shown in Proposition 2 .  
Condition (16) presents an implicit characterization of the optimal production mode. 
We can characterize how labour market imperfections impact on optimal outsourcing 
by reporting the following comparative statics result. 
 
Proposition 5 Increased labour market imperfections promote outsourcing when 
1 < σ . 
Proof: See Appendix B  
     
Proposition 5 captures the idea that the wage-moderating effect of outsourcing is 




VII.  Conclusions  
 
We have studied the consequences of outsourcing for unemployment as well as 
the incentives associated with the introduction of outsourcing. We have shown that 
the wage elasticity of labour demand is increasing as a function of the share of 
outsourcing, which is a result consistent with existing empirical research (see Senses 
(2006)). Furthermore, we have demonstrated that a production mode with a higher 
proportion of outsourcing reduces the negotiated wage in the high-wage country with 
an imperfectly competitive labour market so that outsourcing reduces equilibrium 
unemployment. Finally, and importantly, we have characterized the optimal 
committed production mode by demonstrating that stronger labour market 
imperfections, measured by the relative bargaining power of labour unions, lead to a 
production mode with a higher share of outsourcing.   
Our framework has abstracted from the wage dispersion and its potential 
relationship with various aspects of outsourcing activities. There exists evidence that 
high degrees of unionization and coverage of collective agreements compress the 
wage structure. Also higher degrees of centralization of collective bargaining reduce 
wage dispersion (see e.g. Rowthorn (1992), EEAG (2004) and Wallerstein (1999)). It 
is an important new research topic to analyze the relationships between outsourcing 
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Using (A.1) and (A.2) the wage elasticity of substitution can after some       
rearrangements be written in the following way  
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Appendix B:  Optimal outsourcing and labour market imperfections 
 
According to (16) the optimal production mode is characterized by 
   0 ) (
















.                (B1) 
What is the effect of the union bargaining power on optimal outsourcing?  The 
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K   can after some rearrangements be written 
as follows 
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−   is positive it follows that 
higher bargaining power of the trade union will add to the returns from outsourcing.  
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